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Abstract
We discuss the problem of the continuation of analgesic treatment in an 87-years-old woman with tumor 
of the right femur who suffered from very severe pain, but was unable to make her own decisions. Her son 
objected to the course of management proposed by the doctor and conflicting situation led to the discontinu-
ation of treatment with strong opioids. The complexity of the situation reported here point to the necessity 
of taking advantage of the opportunity to turn to the guardianship courts for a ruling.
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Introduction
The issue of obtaining consent for treatment 
from a patient by his doctor appeared and changed 
as medicine was developing and the patient-doctor 
relationship was changing. From the beginnings of 
medicine, provided the patient was not the sov-
ereign or some other high and mighty person in 
this world, all medical decisions were up to the 
doctor. The patient surrendered to his doctor en-
tirely. New philosophical and political concepts of 
the human being that emphasised his autonomy 
and, therefore, his exclusive right to decide for 
himself brought about some radical changes in 
this area. Laws have, therefore, been adopted that 
ensure the patient’s rights to express his will and 
be involved in all the diagnostic and therapeutic 
decisions related to him; “The mere fact of becom-
ing a patient cannot deprive the person of any 
of his human rights or civil liberties” [1]. Patient 
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rights are a reflection and integral part of human 
rights in the broad sense.
The principle of autonomy and self-decision be-
comes particularly significant in the case of a sick 
person. The situation of the patient in relation to 
the medical staff is characterised by dependence and 
asymmetry of information, which renders making 
decisions about the person’s health and life difficult. 
In this situation, the doctor is not only the party pro-
viding the service but also the party who decides on 
the type of service provided. This imbalance is con-
sidered the justification for the doctor’s domination 
over the patient. However, experience shows that 
it is not always the case that all doctors act solely 
for the benefit of their patients, and the exercising 
of patient rights is aimed, among other things, at 
protecting patients from malpractice. Furthermore, 
the fundamental objections as regards this paternal-
ism result from the question of whether one person, 
however well-informed, can and has the right to 
decide what is good for another person capable of 
making his own decisions.
In Poland, the principle of rendering health servic-
es upon previous provision of consent by the patient 
is expressed in and governed by numerous legal acts.
Since June 2009, the fundamental legal act in Po-
land has been the Patient Rights and Patient Rights Ad-
vocate Act (PRA), according to which a patient has the 
right to die in peace and dignity [2]. The PRA also 
guarantees (the patient or his legally acceptable rep-
resentative) the right to obtain information, in an 
understandable language, regarding the following: 
the patient’s health, the diagnosis, the proposed 
and possible diagnostic methods, the proposed and 
possible therapies, the foreseeable consequences of 
using or failing to use them, the treatment results and 
the prognosis. The doctor may be relieved of this ob-
ligation only at the patient’s request. The doctor can 
provide the above information to other persons only 
with the patient’s consent (Article 31 paragraphs 1–3 
of the Medical and Dental Professions Act [MDPA] 
[3]; Article 19 paragraph 1 point 2 of the Healthcare 
Establishments Act [HEA] [4]).
According to the PRA, the patient has the right 
to give consent for undergoing tests or for receiving 
other healthcare services upon being provided with 
relevant information by his doctor. Unless otherwise 
provided for by the applicable laws, the patient’s con-
sent may be given orally or expressed by the pa-
tient’s behaviour, unequivocally indicating his willing-
ness to undergo the medical activities proposed by the 
doctor (Article 31 paragraphs 1 and 7 of the MDPA; 
Article 19 paragraph 1 point 3 of the HEA).
A provision in Chapter 5 of the MDPA entitled 
“The principles of practicing the medical profession” 
reads: “The doctor can perform a test or provide oth-
er healthcare services, with the exceptions provided 
for hereunder, only after the patient has consented 
to it” (Article 32 paragraph 1 of the MDPA) and 
specifies the principles of providing the consent [3].
A further set of provisions governing the doc-
tor’s conduct in relation to the patient can be found 
in the Code of Medical Ethics (CME) [5], where we 
read the following: “The doctor has the freedom 
to select the methods of management he consid-
ers most effective. He should, however, limit the 
diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive activities to 
those activities which the patient really needs, in 
accordance with the current state of medical knowl-
edge” (Article 6 of the CME). “The doctor should 
make every effort to provide his patient with humane 
terminal care and dignified conditions for dying. The 
doctor should relieve the suffering of a terminally 
ill patient until the very end and maintain, if pos-
sible, the quality of life of a dying patient” (Article 
30 of the CME). “The diagnostic, therapeutic and 
preventive activities require patient consent. If the 
patient is unable to provide informed consent, the 
consent should be provided by his legally acceptable 
representative or the actual caregiver” (Article 15 
paragraph 1 of the CME).
The implementation of these provisions in situ-
ations in which we are able to obtain consent from 
the patient is generally quite straightforward. The 
problem arises when the doctor is unable to obtain 
consent immediately from a patient with impaired 
consciousness or cognitive function and no legally ac-
ceptable representative available in a situation where 
the patient requires continuation of treatment. The 
CME indicates that in such cases consent should be 
sought from the patient’s actual caregiver. However, 
if the actual caregiver objects to the course of man-
agement proposed by the doctor, a very difficult and 
potentially conflicting situation arises. The problem 
of the continuation of analgesic treatment in a fe-
male patient unable to make her own decisions that 
we report below illustrates the difficulties that may 
be encountered by treatment-providing healthcare 
professionals in the context of the specific aspects of 
the role of relatives in making treatment decisions in 
Poland.
Case report
An 87-year-old female patient in a very grave 
condition was transferred from the Geriatrics Depart-
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ment to the Palliative Care Ward. During the hospi-
talisation the patient was diagnosed with a fracture 
of the right femoral neck, most likely secondary to 
a bone tumour. A Doppler ultrasound carried out for 
suspected thrombosis with a massive oedema of the 
femoral area and the pudendal labia revealed a bone 
tumour. The patient’s general condition precluded 
further diagnostic evaluation and radical treatment. 
On admission the patient was emaciated, had grade 
4 bedsores, logical contact with her was very limited, 
and she was suffering from severe and constant pain 
in her right lower limb which increased considerably 
during nursing activities. In view of the above, she 
was started on a continuous subcutaneous infusion 
of tramadol increased to the  dose of 300 mg/day 
and the non-steroid anti-inflammatory drug ketopro-
fen at the dose of 300 mg/day. No pain relief was, 
however, achieved and the  tramadol was changed to 
subcutaneous morphine at the dose of 20 mg/day. 
A minor improvement was achieved, but the nursing 
activities continued to be a source of suffering. The 
dose of the opioid was increased to 30 mg/day in 
a continuous subcutaneous infusion. The next day 
the patient was calm, did not report any pain, even 
during nursing activities, but maintained no logical 
contact.
The same day (Sunday), her son came to visit her 
for the first time. He had not contacted the doc-
tors before, either at the Geriatrics Department or 
at the Palliative Care Ward. He asked to know what 
medications his mother was on and then demanded 
that the analgesics be discontinued because, as he 
argued, his mother had lost logical contact with 
the world outside her after she had been started on 
morphine. He also said that morphine was a narcotic 
drug which would only make his mother die sooner. 
Over the weekends, the on-call doctors at the Pal-
liative Care Ward are doctors normally employed at 
the Department of Emergency Medicine. The on-call 
doctor tried to explain the patient’s condition and 
the necessity of using analgesia due to the previously 
identified severe pain but the son would not budge. 
He left, having made an entry in his mother’s medi-
cal notes saying: “I am Ms Z’s son and demand that 
all the analgesic medication she is receiving should 
be discontinued and that all the treatment should 
be stopped. I am aware of the fact that discontinu-
ation of the drug (morphine) will expose my mom 
to suffering. I take full moral and legal responsibility 
for this decision”. The on-call doctor complied with 
the son’s demands and discontinued the morphine. 
Thus the patient was treated only with already 
administered ketoprofen. This resulted in the ap-
pearance of pain several hours later. The next day 
(Monday), the patient experienced severe pain and 
contact with her was very difficult to maintain due 
to her suffering. The palliative care doctor started 
the patient on tramadol at the maximum dose (up 
to 600 mg/day) but the level of pain relief was still 
unsatisfactory. Constant pain at rest that increased 
during nursing activities was observed. The consult-
ing psychiatrist diagnosed the patient with dementia 
and stated that the patient was unable to make in-
formed decisions regarding her treatment and medi-
cation. A hospital lawyer was also asked to speak 
to the patient’s son and explain the legal situation. 
The son did not change his mind and continued not 
to allow the doctors to give his mother morphine 
or any other strong  opioids. Several days later the 
patient was discharged home at her son’s insistence.
Discussion
The case we present here raised many ques-
tions and controversies among the staff of the Pal-
liative Care Ward.
Can relatives affect treatment? Should rela-
tives decide for the patient if she/he is unable to 
make decisions of her/his own? How far can the rela-
tives influence the doctor’s decisions? Was a mistake 
made in the management of this patient and, if so, 
who made that mistake?
The competences of a patient’s relatives and 
other close persons have been narrowly specified in 
Polish medical law. The fundamental regulations are 
contained in the PRA and the MDPA. The CME adopt-
ed by the National Convention of Physicians and 
Dentists should be applied by doctors in matters not 
provided for in the two legal acts mentioned in the 
previous sentence.
Within the meaning of the PRA, a close person 
is a spouse, a relative or a second-degree direct-line 
in-law, a legally acceptable representative, a person 
living together with the patient, or a person indicated 
by the patient [2]. In this case the patient’s son most 
definitely met these requirements. The legal acts re-
ferred to here do not give close persons any rights to 
give consent for the proposed treatment or to object 
to it. Article 31 paragraph 6 of the MDPA merely 
states that the doctor may provide information to 
a close person if the patient is, for instance, uncon-
scious or unable to understand the meaning of the 
information provided to him, which most definitely 
was the case with our patient [3, 7].
According to Article 17 of the PRA, where the 
patient is, for various reasons, unable to make a deci-
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sion, the decision is made by the legally acceptable 
representative of the patient unable to give consent. 
An adult patient who has not been declared legally 
incapacitated by the court does not usually appoint 
his legally acceptable representative. Close persons, 
such as the spouse, siblings, children, grandchildren, 
etc., are not an adult patient’s legally acceptable 
representatives [2, 7]. Some of these persons may 
be considered the so-called actual caregivers, solely 
authorised to give consent for the patient to un-
dergo diagnostic testing. In practice, this means that 
the competences of close persons, including family 
members, as regards treatment decisions related to 
adults unable to make their own decisions are com-
parable to the rights vested in third parties.
The procedures in such situations are defined 
by Articles 32 and 34 of the MDPA. According to 
the law, where a patient who has no legally accept-
able representative is incapable of making his own 
decision, the doctor, after carrying out tests, may 
provide further healthcare services only after ap-
propriate authorisation has been granted by the 
guardianship court. This rule is especially important 
in the case of treatment discontinuation, with which 
it is often considered difficult (in public opinion) 
to distinguish between euthanasia and failure to 
provide medical assistance. In this case, the doctor 
should file the matter with the guardianship court 
[7]. When issuing the ruling, the court should take 
into account the provision of Article 20 of the PRA, 
which affirms a patient’s right to dignity, including 
the right to die in peace and dignity (“A terminally 
ill patient has the right to receive healthcare ser-
vices that relieve his pain and other sufferings”) 
[2]. The guardianship court should also take into 
account the provisions of deontological acts which 
address doctors (the CME). According to the CME, 
in terminal conditions the doctor “is not obliged to 
undertake and carry out reanimation activities or use 
overzealous therapy and use extraordinary measures” 
(Article 32 of the CME). “The doctor should make 
every effort to provide his patient with humane ter-
minal care and dignified conditions for dying. The 
doctor should relieve the suffering of a terminally ill 
patient until the very end and maintain, if possible, 
the quality of life of a dying patient” (Article 30 of 
the CME).
In everyday practice in Poland, hence in the over-
whelming majority of situations, if close persons or 
the actual caregiver consent to the proposed course 
of action or do not object to it, the proposed course 
of action is followed by the doctors [6]. This re-
sults from the established tradition, according to 
which the role of the patient’s family is considered 
more important than following the rule of law. 
A particular example of such an approach and at the 
same time a considerable social and medical problem 
is the extremely frequent objection voiced by rela-
tives to harvesting organs for transplantation from 
deceased persons. Such objections, although not 
legally binding in Poland, are commonly respected.
The actions taken by the on-call doctor, who 
undoubtedly complied with the patient’s son’s objec-
tion in good faith, was acting against the law and 
as a consequence the situation could be treated as an 
infringement of a fundamental right of a terminally 
ill patient, namely the right to have quality of life 
maintained in the terminal phase and the right to die 
with dignity [2, 5]. According to Article 4 paragraph 
2 of the PRA, in the event of a culpable infringement 
of the patient’s right to die in peace and dignity, the 
court may, at the request of the spouse, relatives or 
in-laws up to the second degree in a direct line, or at 
the request of the legally acceptable representative, 
order the doctor or the healthcare establishment  to 
pay an appropriate sum of money for a socially-ben-
eficial purpose under Article 448 of the Civil Code. 
It is, therefore, possible for another member of the 
patient’s family to file such a demand. This claim 
may be directed against the healthcare establishment 
or against the doctor, if he is not employed by the 
healthcare establishment.
When evaluating the situation presented above, 
one should also take into account the fact that fol-
lowing the rule of law, as in continuing analgesic 
treatment or harvesting organs from a deceased 
patient against the relatives’ will, may also put doc-
tors at risk of being charged because of a conflict 
situation. Well-known and sensationally presented 
charges of euthanasia or the speeding up of the proc-
ess of dying for a patient only to carry out a trans-
plantation affect the behaviour of a patient’s family. 
In society, and even among some of the members of 
the medical community, there is a persisting stere-
otype that morphine is a dangerous and addictive 
medication [8]. Where the decision regarding further 
actions must be made immediately, obtaining a court 
ruling is not possible. All the decisions made are, 
therefore, potential grounds for charges and claims. 
Where the positions of the treating physicians and 
the close persons are different, particularly in the 
situation of a conflict, the risk is very high and then, 
if possible, the decision should be made collectively. 
However, even in the case of unanimous positions, 
there is a small but significant risk of charges and 
claims being brought forward by the close persons, 
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who may base them on the undertaking or failing 
to undertake treatment being against the applicable 
laws [6, 9]. Any decision made by the doctor and 
his team must then be amply justified and docu-
mented.
The analysis of the various aspects of analgesic 
treatment in the situation described here goes well 
beyond the scope and aim of this paper. However, 
the patient was certainly experiencing severe adverse 
effects of morphine, such as excessive somnolence 
and confusion. Following the discontinuation of 
morphine, other methods of analgesia should be 
tried Unfortunately, the subsequent development of 
the situation prevented the doctors from undertak-
ing other attempts to achieve an optimal level of 
pain control.
Conclusion
The analysis of legal acts, particularly the MDPA, 
indicates that doctors can undertake treatment 
without obtaining consent only in situations where 
the value of the patient’s health and life allows them 
to infringe another value, namely the right to 
self-decisions. The MDPA defines the course of 
action in the case of patients who, for various rea-
sons (such as psychiatric illnesses), are incapable of 
expressing informed consent or have been deemed 
by the court to be completely incapacitated.  In 
such situations, the doctor, prior to undertaking 
any medical activities, should obtain consent from 
the patient’s legally acceptable representative, and 
where such a representative is not available or can-
not be contacted, the consent should be sought 
from the guardianship court. Where the patient 
needs to undergo diagnostic testing, the consent 
may be granted by the patient’s actual caregiver. 
This is referred to as “substitute consent” and may 
only be given for routine medical activities that do 
not put the patient at risk. The complexity of the 
situation reported here and the potential charg-
es and claims related to it point to the necessity of 
taking advantage of the opportunity to turn to the 
guardianship courts for a ruling.
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